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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-oooOooo-

STATE OF UTAH, RICH COUNTY,

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 970596-CA

LARRY H. BREITWEISER,
Defendant and Appellant.

Priority No. 2

GROUNDS
Pursuant to Rule 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Mr.
Breitweiser petitions for a rehearing because this Court has overlooked or
misapprehended points of law and facts related to this case. These points of law deal
with voluntariness of consent, attenuation between illegal arrest and subsequent

consent, and physician-patient privilege.1
RESTATEMENT OF ISSUES
(1) Whether there was sufficient attenuation between the illegal arrest of
Mr. Breitweiser and the blood draw?
(2) Whether the consent to the blood draw was voluntary and without
duress or coercion?
(3) Whether the trial court properly denied Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to
Arrest Judgment!
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(1) - (2) The trial court erred by denying Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to
Suppress Evidence. The State failed to show reasonable attenuation between the illegal
arrest and the blood draw, and the blood draw by the EMT were privileged.
"The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion
to suppress evidence are reviewed under a clearly-erroneous standard, and the
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given
to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts.
State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted).
(3) The trial court erred by denying Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Arrest
Judgment. The State failed to show reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and exigent

1

All these points of law are argued below with exception of the physician-patient
privilege due to the Rule 35 15-page limitation. However, this issue had been argued in
detail in the previous Brief of Appellant and the Court is invited to re-visit that argue from
the prior briefing.
2

circumstances in this case. The elements of the offense presented at trial are not
consistent with the law that reasonable minds could conclude that Mr. Breitweiser
should be found Guilty oi Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol Further, Utah Law
requires that all the elements of the crime to proven beyond reasonable doubt in order
to rebut the presumption of innocence.
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a trial court may
arrest judgment "if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense."
The standard for determining whether an order arresting judgment is erroneous is
the same as that applied by an appellate court in determining whether a jury
verdict should be set aside for insufficient evidence. Under that standard, a trial
court may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an
element of the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt as to that element. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); State v.
McCardelL 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219
(Utah 1976).
State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

Course of the Proceedings:
On October 25, 1996, an Information was filed and Mr. Breitweiser was

arraigned in open court wherein he pled Not Guilty. (R. at 7). On March 7, 1996, D.
Bruce Oliver entered his appearance and placed Mr. Breitweiser's jury demand
20). On April 14, 1997, the court set trial to convene on Monday, July 7, 1997 at
10:00 a.m. (R. at 42). On June 30, 1997, the defense filed Mr. Breitweiser's Motion
to Suppress Evidena ? (I ! , it 44 61) On July 7, 1997, the trial court held both the
3

suppression hearing, followed by the jury trial.
During the suppression hearing, the trial court found that the officer
lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Breitweiser. However, the trial court also
determined that Mr. Breitweiser consented to the blood draw.
//.

Disposition in Trial Court:
The trial court denied Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Suppress Evidence and

then the jury convicted him of DUI. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied
Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Arrest Judgment. Said motion was filed on the basis that
the Information filed and the instructions to the jury establishing the elements of the
crime were not consistent with one another. Moreover, the Information is not
consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953, as amended). The court denied the
motion claiming Mr. Breitweiser was being very narrow in his focus and denied same
because there was a lot of evidence that was introduced. (R. at 133(329}).
///.

Statement of Facts:
(A)

From the report:

This matter involves an accident and simply the odor of alcohol and
whether these facts constitute probable cause for an arrest. Deputy Dale Stacey's
report reads:
I came across the vehicle on regular patrol. It was off the road and appeared to
have been rolled. Mr. Breitweiser was trapped under the vehicle. I immediately
called for an ambulance and extrication equipment. We were able to get him
out. I could smell alcohol on him. I asked if he had been drinking. He stated

that he had a couple of beers. I placed him under arrest for DUI and requested a
blood test. He agreed to it and Kerry Stacey drew a sample of blood.
(R. at 8).
Subsequently, the report reads: Mr. Breitweiser, do you understand that yoi
under arrest ? . . . for Driving Under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs.
(R. At 35). Additionally, the report states:
Facts establishing the subject's actual physical control of the motor vehicle are:
The vehicle was wrecked. He said he was the only person in the vehicle.
(R. at 35). Finally, on the last page, the report states that when asked if he had been
drinking, Mr. Breitweiser's response was:
Yes, I've had a couple of beers.
:;i : at 35).
(B)

From testimony, 2

Deputy Dale Stacey was proceeding west on State Road 39, and it runs
approximately 20-22 miles between Woodruff and Monte Cristo, when he happened up
to an accident. (R. ; ~

Before nrrk-ino ;u thr scene, the deputy passed three i

four other vehicles who were traveling eastbound while he was traveling westbound.
He concluded that the accident had just occurred as none of these other vehicles had
stopped to assist prior to his arrn ;ral

rhe location of the accident was approximately

The record does not comport with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
as the trial transcript does not have a sequential number on each of the pages. Therefore
in this section, the appellant uses the original transcript page in referring to a cite to the
record.
5

six or seven miles from Woodruff. (R. at 109). The terrain for this area is mostly
fields and summer range grounds for livestock. Also, the road at the scene has a small
bend with a small incline then it straightens out. (R. at 109).
Mr. Breitweiser's vehicle was observed to be in the field to the south side
of the road right side up. The officer initially believed that a rancher must have driven
it to that position but then felt that it was too close to the fence so he stopped to
investigate. (R. at 110, 130). As he approached the vehicle he noted some damage to
the vehicle,3 the vehicle was right side up, situated on its wheels. He also, observed
some stuff scattered along the shoulder off to the side of the roadway. Also, some skid
marks were noted on the road surface leading to the vehicle. (R. at 110). But the
officer could not see any apparent cause for the accident. (E.g., like a dead animal in
the roadway or on the shoulder. (R. at 117)).
The officer walked down the small embankment and climbed a fence
where the officer soon believed that the vehicle appeared to have gone through, because
it was on the other side of the fence. As he climbed the fence a dog approached him
and started growling, so the officer began talking to the dog, when he heard someone
faindy say, "Hello." The officer asked the voice where he was at, the voice
responded, "I don't know." The officer could not see the man, there was tall grass and

3

Admittedly though, the deputy could not tell whether the damage was fresh or old, only
extensive. (R. at 132). The officer didn't attempt to determine whether the damage was free. (R.
at 133).
6

two ditches in the vicinity. He then started looking for the person while continuing to
I
talk with the man. The deputy finally located the man by crawling through the tall
grass.

1 he man, Mr. Breitweiser, was located pinned under the

vehicle, while the truck's front wheels were in the first ditcl 1 and tl le i ear v* Fheels * ei e
in the second ditch. (R. at 112-13, 129). Mr. Breitweiser was also located in the
second ditch under the tire.
When the officer located Mr Breitweiser, only <i limited conversation
ensued as he complained of some chest pains so the officer indicated that he was going
back to his squad car to call for an ambulance. While at his vehicle, he also requested
for extrication equipment. (R. at 113-14). The officer then returned to Mr.
Breitweiser

»• *md asked him medical related questions (e,g, whether he was

hurting, had back pain, etc.). Mr. Breitweiser responded that he was pinned, he had
chest pains, and he couldn't move his arms. The one rear tire was slightly resting on
Mr. Bi eitweiser's forehead, but the front tire in the ditch kept the vehicle from rolling
back onto his head more. (R. at 115). Because, the depi ity didn't know if he suffered
from a spinal injury that he wasn't going to move him until the ambulance, extrication
equipment, and back immobilization equipment arrived at the scene. (R. at 116).
Approximately 10-15 minutes later, Officer Jim Gregory, offish and
game, arrived at the scene to assist, (r. at 117), and they walked around the scene. The
ambulance did not arrive for approximately 25 minutes after Deputy Stacey's arrival.

7

Mr. Breitweiser was removed from under the vehicle, by the men, EMT Kerry Stacey4
crawled underneath and steadied Mr. Breitweiser's head while the others pulled him
from underneath the truck onto a backboard. (R. at 119). Then they carried him to the
ambulance. During this time, Deputy Stacey smelled what he believed to be the odor
of alcohol. (R. at 120). While in the ambulance, he got closer to Mr. Breitweiser to
see if he could smell the odor again, and he did so he asked him if he had been
drinking. Mr. Breitweiser stated that he had a couple of beers. (R. at 120). Based
exclusively thereupon, the deputy placed Mr. Breitweiser under arrest and asked him if
he would submit to a chemical test. (R. at 120). Mr. Breitweiser responded in the
affirmative, stating, "Yes." The deputy was not the one who drew the blood, rather it
was his brother, Kerry Stacey who drew the blood. (R. at 121).
In trial, the deputy was asked what he thought had caused the accident and
the response was that it just appeared to the officer that Mr. Breitweiser had driven to
the left, over corrected and veered back to the right, (r. at 121), but he agreed that it
was possible that Mr. Breitweiser could have simply driven through the turn because he
was distracted, changing the radio station or getting a soda. (R. at 141). Deputy Stacey
also conceded that it could have been possible that an animal, such as a deer, may have
been in the road, (r. at 142-43), or even that Mr. Breitweiser could have been dozing
off. (R. at 156). Moreover, the deputy failed to check for mechanical failure. (R. at

4

Deputy Stacey's brother.
8

156). Meanwhile, while still pinned under the truck tire, Deputy Stacey asked f\Jr.
Breitweiser what had happened but he reported that he didn't know. (R. at 121).
The blood draw was taken approximately, 8:40 to 8:45 p.m. 5 and just
after he had placed Mr Rreiweiser under aiiest \U :\t I4*M

This was approximately

an hour after Deputy Stacey arrived at the scene.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The blood test in which Mi Breitweiser submitted to was not voluntary.
The State failed to overcome the argument of reasonable attenuation after the i in 1 a:\vfi il
arrest. Hence failing to overcome the high presumption against the waiver of
fundamental constitutional right by clear and convincing evidence that such rights were
waived as required by State v. Harmon. .„^, jiaic v. Arroyo

(

' Fherefore, the ti ial coin t

erroneously denied Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Suppress Evidence.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COUR1 "FAILED 1V CONSIDER THREE KEY POINTS OF LAW RAISED
BY THE DEFENDANT IN BRIEFING: (I) ATTENUATION, (2) THE STATES
HIGH BURDEN TO SHOW VOLUNTARY CONSENT, AND (3) THE BLOOD
DRAW BEING PROTECTED UNDER THE DOCTOR-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE.7

5

Approximately 20 minutes after arriving at the scene. (R. at 124).

« State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) and State v. Arroyo, 796
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).
7

Mr. Breitweiser sufficiently argued all of these points in his initial Brief of
Appellant and for the sake of this Court does include them in this petition for a second

A. Attenuation and the High Burden of the State to Show Consent After Prior
Police Illegality,
This Court overlooked Mr. Breitweiser's attentuation question. In
briefing, Mr. Breitweiser argued the consent test provided in State v. Harmon, 854
P.2d 1037 (Utah App. 1993). In Harmon, this Court addressed the issue of consent
and articulated the test to use in determining:
Harmon also alleges the trial court incorrectly concluded that her consent
to search her home was voluntary because the consent was not freely
given but instead was a product of coercion and duress. Consent to search
is valid under the Fourth Amendment if (1) the consent was voluntarily
given, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of
the prior illegality. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah
1993); Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 918. We apply a correction of error
standard when a defendant challenges the "legal content" of the trial
court's ultimate conclusion that a consent was voluntary or involuntary.
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. The trial court's factual findings will not be
set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. IcL; Barnhart, 210 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 35.
Whether consent to search was voluntarily given is determined from the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the consent, including the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the police conduct.
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263; State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah
App. 1990). In order for consent to be voluntary, (1) there must be clear
and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal, specific, and
freely and intelligently given; (2) the government must prove consent
was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) the

time. In stead to avoid unnecessary duplicity, incorporates said arguments by reference
only. It just appears by reading this Court's Memorandum Decision that the Court
accidentally overlooked these arguments. Based thereon, the defendant shall cite to
particular cases that are supplemental to the main points initial raised in the initial briefing.
10

courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence
that such rights were waived. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App.
1990), affd. 1993 WL 176211 (1993).
Id. (Emphasis added). In the case at hand, the State did not prove that the consent to
the blood draw was voluntarily given consistent with Harmon. Under the existing
circumstances, the consent surely was given under duress and unintelligently. The
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, (Utah 1980) provided the
test to determine duress. The Court stated:
Factors which may show a lack of duress or coercion include: 1) the absence of
a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of
force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of
the vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer.
Id.

The State has not clearly shown that the consent was not under duress.

Nonetheless, this analysis goes far beyond the duress question. As explained in State v.
Ham, 910 P.2d 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1996):
Even if a consent to search is deemed voluntary, it may still be invalid because it
was "obtained by police exploitation of [a] prior illegality." Harmon, 854 P.2d
at 1040; accord Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688; State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 704
(Utah App. 1992). "When the prosecution attempts to prove voluntary consent
after an illegal police action . . . , the prosecution 'has a much heavier burden to
satisfy than when proving consent to search' which does not follow police
misconduct." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687-88 (quoting United States v.
Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted));
accord Robinson, 797 P.2d at 437 n.7. This is because in addition to proving a
valid and voluntary consent to search, the State must also establish the existence
of intervening factors which prove that the consent was sufficiently attenuated
from the police misconduct. Melendrez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d at 414.
It is well settled that evidence is not subject to exclusion if "'the connection
ii

between the illegal police conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence
is "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."'" Castner, 825 P.2d at 704 (citations
omitted).
Id. The Ham Court reiterated the analytical framework stating:
This court has established an analytical framework for determining whether the
State has met its burden of proving that a consent was voluntarily given:
"(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was
'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given'; (2) the
government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express
or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, we] indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights
and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived."
Carter, 812 P.2d at 467 (quoting State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) (quoting United States v.
Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977))); see also United States v. Medlin,
842 F.2d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1988).
Id. In this case, the consent resulted from the officer's exploitation of the
circumstances. Mr. Breitweiser was illegally placed under arrest after being placed
under the physician care of the officer's brother, who was the treating EMT. This
arrest was determined to be without probable cause (or reasonable cause).
Nonetheless, immediately following the illegal arrest, the officer requested a blood
draw of Mr. Breitweiser. Mr. Breitweiser submitted, however, under the
circumstances it could not be with consent. The State concedes that Mr. Breitweiser
was injuried in a roll-over accident. The State concedes that Mr. Breitweiser was
pinned in his pick-up and needed to be extricated from the vehicle. How can the State
show that any consent was not influenced by any head injury, let alone that the consent
12

was not unduly influenced by the illegal arrest immediately preceding the officer's
request.

B. "But for" Test Resulted in Prior Certiorari and Reversal,
In the recent past, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d
684 (Utah 1990) issued certiorari to the Court of Appeals regarding this very issue of
attentuation and consent. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and
remanded it back to the trial court to determine voluntariness of the consent, and to
specifically determine whether the consent was an exploitation of the illegal stop, and
the scope of the consent.
The Arroyo Court explained that
[w]hen the prosecution attempts to prove voluntary consent after an illegal police
action (e.g., unlawful arrest or stop), the prosecution "has a much heavier
burden to satisfy than when proving consent to search" which does not follow
police misconduct. United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th
Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1978)).
Id. The Court adopted the "but for" test from U.S. Supreme Court rulings like Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88,83 S.Ct. 407 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963).
The Court explained:
In cases involving the admissibility of evidence obtained as a consequence of
police misconduct, the United States Supreme Court has eschewed a "but for"
test. Under such a test, all evidence that would not have been discovered but for
the initial police misconduct would be suppressed.
Id. In this case, the State has not met it's high burden to show sufficient attentuation
13

between the illegal arrest and the consent. There were no intervening incidents that
would dissipate the taint caused by the illegal arrest. Judge Judkins ruled that the
officer lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Breitweiser. However, as this court stated
in it's memorandum decision "although the officer on the scene did not have sufficient
probable cause to arrest defendant, reasonable grounds existed for the officer to believe
defendant may have been in violation of section 41-6-44(l)(a), thereby justifying the
officer's request that defendant's blood be drawn for purposes of administering a blood
alcohol test." This understanding goes to support good faith of the officer. Good faith
is not the issue before this court. Good faith was struck down in State v. Mendoza,
748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987). However, the State is required to prove good faith rather
they are required to prove the voluntariness of the consent and this burden is high as
explained hereinabove. In this case, the State cannot show that the consent was
voluntary. The State cannot show that there was any intervening circumstance to
dissipate any prior taint. The State cannot show any clear and convincing evidence that
Mr. Breitweiser was capable of rendering consent giving the fact that he suffered
injuries as a result of his accident. Also, the State cannot show that the consent was a
knowing waiver of his physician-patient privilege considering that the EMT was acting
as medical care provider rather than the arresting officer's brother.
In this matter, the officer told Mr. Breitweiser that he was under arrest
for Driving Under the Influence and then immediately asked him to submit to a

14

chemical test. After just being pinned underneath his truck by his head, it is equally
clear that Mr. Breitweiser may not have been in the frame of mind to reason the
question and ponder his rights! In this matter, the officer sought to exploit the illegal
arrest by demanding a blood draw. Under the circumstances, it is quite clear that the
question of the defendant's state of mind or his capacity to render consent should be in
question. With this in mind, it is clear by a review of the record, that the State has
failed to demonstrate that consent was voluntary to the point that the State has
overcome it's Harmon and Arroyo obligation to show that the consent was clear and
convincing. Finally, both the trial court and this Court have failed to indulge every
possible presumption against the waiver, including the lack of capacity to consent.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Breitweiser respectfully requests this
Court reconsider it's October 14, 1998 decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of
October, 1998.
D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 29th day of October,
1998,1 served a copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING upon the
counsel for the Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class
mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: George W. Preston, Rich
County Attorney, 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah 84321.
Dated this 29th day of October, 1998.
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